In this paper, we continue this line of research and show that most existing somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes are not IND-CCA1 secure. In fact, we show that these schemes suffer from key recovery attacks (stronger than a typical IND-CCA1 attack), which allow an adversary to recover the private keys through a number of decryption oracle queries. The schemes, that we study in detail, include those by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan at Crypto 2011 and FOCS 2011, and that by Gentry, Sahai and Waters at Crypto 2013. We also develop a key recovery attack that applies to the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme by van Dijk et al., and our attack is more efficient and conceptually simpler than the one developed by Zhang et al.. Our key recovery attacks also apply to the scheme by Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan at ITCS 2012, and we also describe a key recovery attack for the scheme developed by Brakerski at Crypto 2012.
Introduction
In 1978, Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [RAD78] introduced the concept of privacy homomorphism and asked whether it is possible to perform arbitrary operations on encrypted ciphertexts. 30 years later, Gentry [Gen09b] gave a positive answer by proposing an ingenious approach to construct fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes. With this approach, we can start with a somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) scheme that can perform only limited number of operations on ciphertexts (i.e. it can evaluate only low-degree polynomials). Then, through the so-called bootstrapping step, we can turn this SHE scheme into an FHE scheme. Even though SHE schemes are less powerful than FHE schemes, they can already be used in many useful real-world applications, such as medical and financial applications [NLV11] . Note that researchers have proposed the concept of leveled FHE schemes (e.g. [BGV12, GSW13] ), which allow third parties to evaluate any circuits up to a certain depth. In the following discussion, we treat these schemes as SHE.
Related Work
After Gentry's work, many SHE and FHE schemes have been proposed. Based on the underlying hardness assumptions, these schemes can be categorized as follows.
(1) The first category starts with Gentry [Gen09a, Gen09b] . A number of variations, optimizations and implementations appear in [SV10, GH11b] . The security of these schemes are based on hard problems on lattices. (2) The second category starts with van Dijk et al. [vDGHV10] . More variants, implementation and optimizations appear in [CMNT11,CNT12,CCK + 13]. The security of these schemes rely on the approximate greatest common divisor (AGCD) problem and some variants. It is worth mentioning that Ding and Tao [DT14] claim to have found an algorithm to solve the AGCD problem with some special parameters in polynomial time. However, the AGCD problem and its variants are still believed to be hard. (3) The third category starts with Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV11b, BV11a] . More variants appear in [NLV11, BGV12, GHS12b, Bra12, GSW13] . The security of these schemes are based on the learning with errors (LWE) and on the ring-learning with errors (RLWE) problems.
See Fig. 1 Recently, Nuida [Nui14] proposed a new framework for noise-free FHE, based on finite non-commutative groups. This is completely different from everything appeared in literature 2 so far, since the ciphertext in all known schemes carry some noise. Nevertheless, a secure instantiation has yet to be found. There exists another family of schemes, based on the NTRU encryption scheme [HPS98] . In [LATV12] it is shown how to obtain a homomorphic encryption scheme in a multi-user setting, introducing the notion of multi-key homomorphic encryption where it is possible to compute any function on plaintexts encrypted under multiple public keys. The multikey FHE of [LATV12] is based on the NTRU scheme [HPS98] and on ideas introduced in [BGV12] . We will not focus on NTRU-based multi-key homomorphic encryption schemes.
All known SHE and FHE schemes have been developed with the aim of being IND-CPA secure (resistant against a chosen-plaintext attack). In [Gen09b] , Gentry left it as a future work to investigate SHE schemes with IND-CCA1 security (i.e. secure against a non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack). At this moment, we have the following results.
-No SHE and FHE scheme can be IND-CCA2 (secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack). The reason is straightforward, based on the fact that the adversary is allowed to manipulate the challenged ciphertext and submit it to the decryption oracle in an IND-CCA2 attack. -With Gentry's approach, the resulted FHE scheme cannot be IND-CCA1 secure. The reason is also straightforward, based on the fact that the private key is encrypted and the adversary is able to submit the ciphertext to the decryption oracle. -Loftus et al. [LMSV12] showed that Gentry's SHE scheme [Gen09b] is not IND-CCA1 secure and presented an IND-CCA1 attack against the variation proposed in [GH11b] . They also showed that the same attack applies to the other variant by Smart and Vercauteren [SV10] . In fact, the attacks are both key recovery attacks. Moreover, they modified the SHE in [SV10] and proved its IND-CCA1 security based on a new assumption. Zhang et al. [ZPS12] presented an IND-CCA1 attack against the SHE scheme in [vDGHV10] , which can recover the secret key with O(λ 2 ) queries where λ is the security parameter.
In theory, IND-CPA security may be enough for us to construct cryptographic protocols, in particular if we assume semi-honest attackers. However, key recovery attacks will pose serious threat for practical usage of SHE and FHE. If a malicious attacker submits manipulated ciphertexts and observes the behavior (side channel leakage) of the decryptor, then it may be able to recover all plaintexts in the system. Therefore, it is very desirable to design SHE and FHE with IND-CCA1 security, or at least to avoid key recovery attacks.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we continue the line of work of [LMSV12, ZPS12] to present key recovery attacks for the schemes [BV11b, BV11a, GSW13, Bra12] . Our attacks can also be applied to the SHE scheme in [BGV12] . We also develop a new key recovery attack against the SHE scheme in [vDGHV10] , and our attack is more efficient and conceptually simpler than that from [ZPS12] . Our results essentially show that the SHE schemes underlying the FHE schemes in category (3) above are not IND-CCA1 secure. Combining the results from [LMSV12,ZPS12], we can conclude that most existing SHE schemes, except that from [LMSV12] , suffer from key recovery attacks so that they are not IND-CCA1 secure. 3
Structure of the Paper
In Section 2, we recall some background on SHE and FHE schemes. Starting from Section 4, we are going to develop key recovery attacks against the aforementioned SHE schemes. In Section 8, we conclude the paper.
Preliminaries
Let N be the set of natural numbers, Z the ring of integers, Q the field of rational numbers, and F q a finite field with q elements, where q is a power of a prime p. In particular, we will consider often F p = Z/pZ = Z p . If r ∈ Z q , we indicate as r −1 its inverse in Z q , i.e. that value such that r −1 · r = 1 mod q. For a ring R and a (two-sided) ideal I of R, we consider the quotient ring R/I. For given vectors v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) ∈ Z n q , we let < v, w >= i v i w i the dot product of v, w. For a given rational number x ∈ Q, we let x , x and x be respectively the rounding function, the floor function and the ceiling function. For a given integer n ∈ N, n + 1/2 = n + 1. To indicate that an element a is chosen uniformly at random from a set A we use notation a $ ← A. For a set A, we let its cardinality be |A|. We consider also the standard basis {e i } n i=1 of R n , where the coefficients of e i are all 0 except for the i-th coefficient, which is 1.
Unless otherwise specified, λ will always denote the security parameter of the encryption schemes. In the asymmetric schemes we are going to discuss, the secret key will be denoted as sk, and the public key will be pk.
Homomorphic Encryption
The following definitions are adapted from [Gen09b] . We only assume bit-by-bit public-key encryption, i.e. we only consider encryption schemes that are homomorphic with respect to boolean circuits consisting of gates for addition and multiplication mod 2. Extensions to bigger plaintext spaces and symmetric-key setting are straightforward; we skip the details.
Definition 1 (Homomorphic Encryption). A public key homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme is a set of four algorithms E = (KeyGen E , Encrypt E , Decrypt E , Evaluate E ) all of which must run in polynomial time. When the context is clear, we will often omit the index E.
KeyGen(λ) = (sk, pk) -input: λ -output: sk; pk Encrypt(pk, m) = c -input: pk and plaintext m ∈ F 2 -output: ciphertext c Decrypt(sk, c) = m -input: sk and ciphertext c -output: m ∈ F 2 Evaluate(pk, C, (c 1 , . . . , c r )) = c e -input: pk, a circuit C, ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c r , with c i = Encrypt(pk, m i ) -output: ciphertext c e Definition 2 (Correct Homomorphic Decryption). The public key homomorphic encryption scheme E = (KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Evaluate) is correct for a given t-input circuit C if, for any key-pair (sk, pk) output by KeyGen(λ), any t plaintext bits m 1 , . . . , m t , and any ciphertexts c = (c 1 , . . . , c t ) with c i ← Encrypt E (pk, m i ), Decrypt(sk, Evaluate(pk, C, c)) = C(m 1 , . . . , m t ) holds. 4
Definition 3 (Homomorphic Encryption). E = (KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Evaluate) is homomorphic for a class C of circuits if it is correct for all circuits C ∈ C. We say that E is a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme if it is correct for all boolean circuits.
Informally, a homomorphic encryption scheme that can perform only a limited number of operations is called a somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) scheme.
Security Definitions
The security of a public-key encryption scheme in terms of indistinguishability is normally presented as a game between a challenger and an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ). The scheme is considered secure if no adversary can win the game with significantly greater probability than an adversary who must guess randomly. The game runs in two stages:
The adversary is said to win the game if b = b , with the advantage of the adversary winning the game being defined by
A scheme is said to be IND-atk secure if no polynomial time adversary A can win the above game with non-negligible advantage in the security parameter λ. The precise security notion one obtains depends on the oracle access one gives the adversary in its different stages:
-If A has access to no oracles in either stage then atk=CPA (indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack) -If A has access to a decryption oracle in stage one then atk=CCA1 (indistinguishability under non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) -If A has access to a decryption oracle in both stages then atk=CCA2, often now denoted simply CCA (indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) -If A has access to a ciphertext validity oracle in both stages, which on input of a ciphertext determines whether it would output ⊥ or not on decryption, then atk=CVA.
According to the definition, in order to show that a scheme is not IND-CCA1 secure, we only need to show that an adversary can guess the bit b with a non-negligible advantage given access to the decryption oracle in Stage 1. Formally, in a key recovery attack, an adversary can output the private key given access to the decryption oracle in Stage 1. In comparison, a key recovery attack is stronger than a typical IND-CCA1 attack. 5
3 Key Recovery Attack against the vDGHV10 Scheme
In [ZPS12] , Zhang, Plantard and Susilo presented a key recovery attack against the the vDGHV10 scheme from [vDGHV10] . Given O(λ 2 ) decryption oracle queries, an attacker can recover the private key. Let η be the bit-length of the secret key p, O(λ 2 ) = 3(η + 3) in the best case.
In this section, we describe a more efficient and conceptually simpler key recovery attack. Our attack is optimal in the sense that it recovers directly the secret key with at most η oracle queries. Note that the decryption oracle outputs one bit at a time.
The vDGHV SHE Scheme
We start by presenting the (asymmetric) SHE scheme as presented in [vDGHV10] . The message space is M = Z 2 . The scheme is parametrized by γ (bit-length of the integers in the public key), η (bit-length of the secret key), ρ (bit-length of the noise), and τ (the number of integers in the public key). We also consider a secondary noise parameter ρ = ρ+ω(logλ). For a specific (η-bit) odd positive integer p, consider the following distribution over γ-bit integers:
The algorithms of the vDGHV SHE scheme are defined as follows:
-
Decrypt(sk, c)
The New Key Recovery Attack
Since η = #bits(p), we immediately obtain odd lower and upper bounds l p and u p , respectively, for p:
Notice explicitly that p can only assume the odd values 2 η−1 + 1, 2 η−1 + 3, . . . , 2 η − 3, 2 η − 1. In particular, between 2 η−1 and 2 η there are 2 η−2 candidate values for p. We can also argue that between l p and u p there are (u p − l p )/2 = 2 η−2 − 1 even integers. Let H (lp,up) = {0, 1, . . . , 2 η−2 − 2}, these integers can be denoted as l p + 2h + 1 for h ∈ H (lp,up) . Now, the idea of the key-recovery attack is as follows: consider the 'ciphertext' c = l p + 2h + 1 for a given h ∈ H (lp,up) . Submit c to the decryption oracle O D ; we will obtain a bit b ← O D (c) = (c mod p) mod 2. There are two cases to distinguish:
Update l p ← l p + 2h + 2. 6
Next, we repeat the decryption query with the updated values for l p , u p and with another even 'ciphertext' c ∈ [l p +1, u p −1], and we stop when u p = l p . In particular, for efficiency we always choose c as the even integer in the middle of the interval [l p + 1, u p − 1]. It is easy to see that this attack leads to a full recovery of the secret key p with at most log(2 η−2 − 2) ≈ η oracle queries.
Algorithmic Description
Formally, the attack can be described by Algorithm 1. It takes as input an integer η ∈ N and outputs the secret integer p. Let
x o = max{n ∈ N s.t. n is odd and n ≤ x} Algorithm 1 Key Recovery Attack
Key Recovery Attack against the BV11b Scheme
In this section, we describe a key recovery attack against the SHE scheme from [BV11b] .
The BV11b SHE Scheme
The message space is M = Z 2 . Let f be a polynomial in λ, i.e. f (λ) = poly(λ). Consider n = f (λ) ∈ N and let ∈ (0, 1) ∩ R. Assume an odd integer q ∈ N such that q ∈ [2 n , 2 · 2 n ), and an integer m ≥ nlog q + 2λ. Let χ be a noise distribution over Z q (it produces small samples, all of magnitude not greater than n). Finally, let L ∈ N be an upper bound on the maximal multiplicative depth that the scheme can homomorphically evaluate, say L ≈ log n.
Notice that the vectors s 1 , . . . , s L−1 are used in order to compute the evaluation key, which we omit here. We remark that during the homomorphic evaluation, the scheme generates ciphertexts of the form c = ((v, w), l), where the tag l indicates the multiplicative level at which the ciphertext has been generated (fresh ciphertexts are tagged with l = 0). Note that it always holds that l ≤ L due to the bound on the multiplicative depth, and that the output of the homomorphic evaluation of the entire circuit is expected to have l = L. As described in [BV11b] , the SHE scheme is only required to decrypt ciphertexts that are output by the evaluation step (which we omit here), and those will always have level tag L. Therefore, we always expect a ciphertext of the form c = ((v, w), L) and decryption is correct. Apparently, we cannot decrypt level l ciphertexts c = ((v, w), l), for 1 ≤ l < L, since we are only allowed to decrypt level L ciphertexts. However, we can compute L − l fresh encryptions of 1, namely c 1 , . . . , c L−l . Then, we compute c
. . , c L−l ) based on the homomorphic property, where M U L is the multiplication circuit. The resulting ciphertext c * will encrypt the same message as c does, and with a tag level L. In particular, we can decrypt fresh ciphertexts.
Our Key Recovery Attack
We are going to recover the secret key s L ∈ Z n q component-wise, and bit by bit. For ease of notation, we will write s instead of s L . More precisely, we write s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ Z n q . For every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have s j ∈ Z q and therefore s j can be written with a maximum number N of bits, where N = log 2 (q − 1) + 1. We are going to recover the i-th bit of s j , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N and for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Intuitively, our attack works as follows. We start by finding the first bit of s j for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n; then we will recover the second bit of s j for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n; and we stop until we reach the N -th bit. In order to do so, we have to choose a 'ciphertext' c to be submitted to the decryption oracle. Instead of submitting c = (v, w) for honestly-generated v ∈ Z n q and w ∈ Z q , we submit c * = (x, y) for some specifically-picked x ∈ Z n q and y ∈ Z q . We omit to write the level tag since we can always obtain a level tag L from any l ≤ L.
For any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let (s j ) 2 := a j,N a j,N −1 · · · a j,1 be the binary representation of s j (bits ordered from most significant to least significant). We have a j,i ∈ {0, 1}, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Recovering a j,1
We have to choose x ∈ Z n q and y ∈ Z q in such a way that y− < x, s > mod q = s j . To do so, pick y = 0 and x = (0, . . . , 0, −1, 0, . . . , 0) (where -1 is in position j). Then, we 8 have 0 − (−1)s j mod q = s j mod q = s j . As a result, by modding out with 2, this will return the last bit a j,1 of s j .
Recovering a j,2
Now that we know the last bit a j,1 of s j , we want to obtain s (1) j := (s j − a j,1 )/2 ∈ Z q whose bit decomposition is the same as the bit decomposition of s j , but with the last bit removed from it. Then, modding out by 2, we will get the desired bit. This translates to the following condition: find x ∈ Z n q and y ∈ Z q such that y− < x, s > mod q = (s j − a j,1 )/2. Let x = (0, . . . , 0, x j , 0, . . . , 0) (with x j in j-th position). We have to find y and x j such that 2y − s j (2x j + 1) = −a j,1 mod q. Clearly, the solution is given by x j = −2 −1 mod q and y = −2 −1 a j,1 mod q. By querying the decryption oracle with the 'ciphertext' c * := (x, y), we obtain the second-to-last bit a j,2 of s j .
Recovering a j,m , for 1 ≤ m ≤ N Based on the above two cases, we generalize the procedure. Suppose we have found all bits a j,i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. In order to recover the bit a j,m , we choose x := (0, . . . , 0, x j , 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Z n q and y ∈ Z q as follows:
Algorithmic Description and Efficiency Analysis
We denote the decryption oracle O D (c) := Decrypt(sk, c). The ciphertext c is of the form c = (x, y) (the level tag is omitted), with x ∈ Z n q , y ∈ Z q . For ease of notation, we have also considered the standard vectors e 1 , . . . , e n ∈ Z n q : for every i = 1, . . . , n, e i is the 0-vector except in position i, where it has value 1, i.e. e i = (e i,1 , . . . , e i,n ) = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), e i,i = 1, e i,j = 0 for j = i. Formally, the attack from Section 4.2 can be described by Algorithm 2. It takes as input the integers n, q and returns the secret key vector s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ Z n q .
Algorithm 2 Key Recovery Attack
The secret key vector s = s L ∈ Z n q has n coefficients s j , and each one of them has length of at most N bits. Now, n = f (λ) for a polynomial function f (λ) = poly(λ), and 9 N = log 2 (q − 1) + 1. We have that q ∈ [2 n , 2 n +1 ), with ∈ (0, 1) ∩ R a constant, and
where g(λ) = poly(λ) . Therefore, the total number of queries we must perform to recover s is n × N < f (λ) · g(λ) = poly(λ) +1 . Since each query to the decryption oracle reveals one bit of s, our attack is optimal and ends in polynomial time.
Key Recovery Attack against the BV11a Scheme
In this section, we describe a key recovery attack against the symmetric-key SHE scheme from [BV11a] . The attack also applies to the asymmetric-key SHE scheme.
The BV11a SHE Scheme
Consider primes q = poly(λ) ∈ N, t = poly(λ) ∈ Z * q . Let n = poly(λ) ∈ N and consider a polynomial
Namely, a message is encoded as a degree n polynomial with coefficients in Z t . Let χ be an error distribution over the ring R q := Z q [x]/(f (x)) and let D ∈ N, which is related to the maximal degree of homomorphism allowed (and to the maximal ciphertext length). Parameters n, f, q, χ are public.
We remark that while the encryption algorithm only generates ciphertexts c ∈ R 2 q , homomorphic operations (as described in the evaluation algorithm which we omit here) might add more elements to the ciphertext. Thus, the most generic form of a decryptable ciphertext in this scheme is c = (c 0 , . . . , c d ) ∈ R 
Our Key Recovery Attack
We can write
with coefficients s j ∈ Z q , ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n. We will recover each coefficient s j separately. Now, each s j has at most N := log 2 (q −1) +1 bits; therefore #bits(s) ≤ (n + 1) × N = (n + 1) × ( log 2 (q − 1) + 1) and each query to the oracle decryption will reveal a polynomial µ(
we have #bits(µ) ≤ (n + 1) × ( log 2 (t − 1) + 1). Therefore, the minimum number of oracle queries needed is given by #(bits(s)) #(bits revealed by an oracle query) = (n + 1) × ( log 2 (q − 1) + 1) (n + 1) × ( log 2 (t − 1) + 1) = log 2 (q − 1) + 1 log 2 (t − 1) + 1
We are going to query the decryption oracle with 'ciphertexts' of the form c *
for some h i , y i ∈ R q . We will describe in detail our attack in the case t = 2. An easy generalization for t ≥ 2 is discussed later.
An easy case: t = 2.
We expect to query the decryption oracle at least log 2 (q − 1) + 1 times and recover s j , for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n, bit by bit. Let N = #bits(s j ) = log 2 (q − 1) + 1, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n; and let (s j ) 2 = a j,N a j,N −1 · · · a j,1 be the binary representation of s j , ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n (i.e., a j,i ∈ {0, 1}, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N and bits ordered most significant to least significant). For ease of notation, we write c * = (h, y) instead of c * = (h, y, 0, . . . , 0).
Recovering a j,1 , for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n For a submitted 'ciphertext' c * = (h, y), decryption works as follows: < c * , s > mod 2 = h + ys mod 2. We choose h = n j=0 0x j = 0 ∈ R q and y = 1 + n j=1 0x j = 1 ∈ R q . The decryption oracle outputs s mod 2 = (s 0 mod 2) + (s 1 mod 2)x + · · · + (s n mod 2)x n = a 0,1 + a 1,1 x + · · · + a n,1 x n Therefore, we obtain the last bits a j,1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, which are n bits of s. Recovering a j,2 , ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n With a j,1 for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n, we are going to recover a j,2 , ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n, as follows. We want to obtain
for which the bit decomposition of the coefficients s
(1) j is the same as the bit decomposition of s j , but with the last bit removed from it, for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n. Then, by modding out with 2, we will get the desired bits. This translates to the following condition: find c
, from which we obtain 2h + s(2y − 1) = −(a 0,1 + a 1,1 x + · · · + a n,1 x n ). A solution is given by y = 2 −1 ∈ R q and h = −2 −1 (a 0,1 + a 1,1 x + · · · + a n,1 x n ) ∈ R q . Then, by modding out with 2 the 'decrypted ciphertext' µ =< c * , s >, we recover the second-to-last bits a j,2 , for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n.
Suppose we have found all bits a j,i , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 and ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n. We want to recover a j,m , ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n. By a recursive argument, we find that we have to submit a 11
This concludes the attack for the case t = 2. Efficiency-wise, the total number of oracle queries is N = log 2 (q − 1) + 1, which is optimal.
The general case: t ≥ 2.
We consider now the general case in which t ≥ 2 is a prime number in Z * q . We want to find s = s 0 + s 1 x + · · · + s n x n ∈ Z q [x]/(f (x)) and expect to query the decryption oracle log 2 (q−1) +1 log 2 (t−1) +1
times. With each query to the decryption oracle, we are going to recover M = log 2 (t − 1) + 1 bits of s j , ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n. The idea is that we are going to recover s j , for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n. In its representation in base t, s j can be represented with N figures a j,i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 1}: (s j ) t = a j,N a j,N −1 · · · a j,1 where N = log t (q − 1) + 1; each a j,i is bounded by t − 1, which explains the value M = log 2 (t − 1) + 1.
, decryption works as follows: < c * , s > modt = x + ys mod t. We choose h = 0 ∈ R q and y = 1 ∈ R q . Then, the decryption oracle outputs
We want to recover a j,m , for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n. To do so, we submit to the decryption oracle a 'ciphertext' c * = (h, y)
It is straightforward to verify that it works and we skip the details here.
Algorithmic Description
Formally, the attack from Section 5.2 can be described by Algorithm 3. It takes as input integers q, t, n, D ∈ N and a polynomial f (x) ∈ Z[x] of degree n. It outputs the secret key vector
, where y, 0, . . . , 0) ).
Key Recovery Attack against the BGV12 Scheme
The SHE scheme from [BGV12] is closely related to the SHE schemes from [BV11a, BV11b] . This implies that the attacks from Section 5.2 and 4.2 can be directly applied against the SHE scheme from [BGV12] .
Algorithm 3 Key Recovery Attack
We first remark that the LWE and RLWE problems are syntactically equivalent. They only use different rings (Z for LWE, and a polynomial ring Z[x]/(x d + 1) for RLWE), as well as different vector dimensions over these rings (n = poly(λ) for LWE, n = 1 for RLWE). For this reason and to simplify the presentation, the authors of [BGV12] introduced the general learning with errors (GLWE) problem, which is a generalized version of LWE and RLWE.
Definition 4 (GLWE problem). For security parameter λ, let n = n(λ) be an integer dimension, let f (x) = x d + 1 where d = d(λ) is a power of 2, let q = q(λ) ≥ 2 be a prime integer, let R = Z[x] = (f (x)) and R q = R/qR, and let χ = χ(λ) be a distribution over R. The GLWE n,f,q,χ problem is to distinguish the following two distributions:
• one first draws s ← R The GLWE n,f,q,χ assumption is that the GLWE n,f,q,χ problem is infeasible.
LWE is GLWE when d = 1, and RLWE is GLWE when n = 1. Let's review the GLWE-based encryption scheme.
Setup(λ):
-use bit b ∈ {0, 1} to determine whether we are setting parameters for a LWE-based scheme (d = 1) or a RLWE-based scheme (n = 1). -choose µ-bit modulus q and d, n, N, χ (all polynomials in λ, µ, b) in order to have a GLWE-based scheme with 2 λ security against known attacks. -set A to be the (n + 1)-column matrix consisting of b followed by the n columns of −A . (Remark:
The SHE scheme from [BGV12] uses the above GLWE-based encryption scheme as the main building block, and we only need to show attacks against the latter. Depending on which instantiation is chosen (either LWE or RLWE), we can apply one of the key recovery attacks against [BV11b, BV11a] to the basic GLWE-based encryption scheme. which is (w− < v, s L > modq) mod 2. The secret key can be recovered by directly applying the key recovery attack from Section 4.2.
The scheme is slightly different from the BV11a SHE scheme just for the encryption part, but the setup, the key generation and the decryption steps are the same. Therefore, our key recovery attack can be applied. Precisely, to recover the secret polynomial s := s(
, one could directly use our key recovery attack from Section 5.2 with the following settings:
Key Recovery Attack against the Bra12 SHE Scheme
In this section, we describe a key recovery attack against the SHE scheme from [Bra12] . The scheme uses, as a building block, Regev's [Reg05] public-key encryption scheme. It is then enough to show a key recovery attack on Regev's scheme since the full [Bra12] can be attacked exactly as the basic Regev's encryption scheme (the only differences between the two schemes are in the evaluation step which is missing in Regev's scheme).
Let's first recall Regev's encryption scheme. In this scheme, let n := λ be the security parameter.
The Bra12 SHE Scheme (Regev's Encryption Scheme)
Let q be a prime number and let χ = χ(n) be a distribution ensemble over Z. The message space is M = {0, 1}. As claimed in [Reg05] , choosing q such that n 2 ≤ q ≤ 2n 2 is enough for security (in particular, q = poly(n); for other parameters settings, see [Reg05] ).
SecretKeyGen(n) :
Decrypt(sk, c):
Our Key Recovery Attack
Recall that we defined the rounding function · such that m + 1/2 := m + 1 for every m ∈ N. The following attack works also, with trivial modifications, in case we define m+1/2 := m. In this section, for a given ciphertext c we use notation D(c) instead of Decrypt(sk, c).
We will start by describing how to recover s 1 . An easy generalization will allow to recover s j , ∀j = 1, 2, . . . , n. We are going to submit to the decryption oracle 'ciphertexts' of the form c = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n+1 ) ∈ Z q s 1 ; then we have u ∈ {0, 1, 2}. In particular, it is easy to see that
Remember that q is prime, so in particular 
So in both cases 1 and 2, the total number of oracle queries needed to recover s 1 is ≈ q 2 . Remark 1. We can provide an exact simpler formula for T 1 and T 2 . Recall that q ≥ 2 is prime; we can reasonably assume q odd. Then one can check that
In particular, the total number T tot of oracle queries needed to recover s 1 is T tot ≤ Keep reasoning this way, we will obtain s 1 in log 2 (M b ) + 1 ≈ log 2 (q/2) oracle queries.
Recovering s j , for j = 1, . . . , n. Similarly, and more in general, we can recover s j , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n. In this case, the 'ciphertext' to submit is c = (c 1 , c 2 
if k = 1 and it is the first query to the decryption oracle c 1,i if k = 1 and it is not the first query, 1 ≤ c 1,
Algorithmic Description and Efficiency
For a given vector c = (c 1 , . . . , c n+1 ) ∈ Z n+1 q , we denote the decryption oracle as O D (c) := Decrypt(sk, c). For ease of notation, we define the following function. Let j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and a, b ∈ Z q ; define the function f j : (a 1 , . . . , a n+1 ) with a 1 = b 1 , a j+1 = b 2 and a k = 0 for k = 1, j + 1. Algorithm 4 takes as input the integers n, q and returns the secret key s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ Z n q . Algorithm 5 is the optimized version of it.
Algorithm 4 Key-Recovery Attack
end if end if end for return s := (s1, . . . , sn)
Notice that max(M 0 , M 1 ) = (q + 1)/2 =: M . Therefore, in the worst case the total number T tot of oracle queries needed to recover s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ Z n q is
In the optimized version, the total number T opt tot of oracle queries is T opt tot ≤ n · (1 + log 2 (M ) + 1 ) ≈ n · (1 + log 2 (q/2)) Therefore, our optimized key recovery algorithm is indeed optimal since the number of oracle queries needed to recover the secret key is not greater than the bits of the secret key (and one oracle query reveals on bit at a time). In fact:
In particular the above algorithm is polynomial in the security parameter n: recall that the suggested parameters in Regev's encryption scheme [Reg05] for q are n 2 ≤ q ≤ 2n 2 ; therefore we have T opt tot = O(nlog n).
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Algorithm 5 Optimized Key-Recovery Attack
Key Recovery Attack against the GSW13 SHE Scheme
In this section, we describe a key recovery attack against the SHE scheme from [GSW13] . We first give some useful preliminary definitions. Let q, k ∈ N. Let l be the bit-length of q, i.e. l = log 2 q + 1, and let N = k · l. Consider a vector a := (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ∈ Z k q , and let (a i ) 2 := a i,0 a i,1 . . . a i,l−1 be the binary decomposition of a i (bit ordered least to most significant), for every i = 1, . . . , k. We define BitDecomp(a) := (a 1,0 , . . . , a 1,l−1 , . . . , a k,0 , . . . , a k,l−1 ) ∈ Z N q For a given a := (a 1,0 , . . . , a 1,l−1 , . . . , a k,0 , . . . , a k,l−1 ) ∈ Z N q , let
We notice explicitly that a does not necessarily lie in {0, 1} N , but when it does then BitDecomp −1 is the inverse of BitDecomp. For a ∈ Z N q , we define
When A is a matrix, let BitDecomp(A), BitDecomp −1 (A), Flatten(A) be the matrix formed by applying the operation to each row of A separately. Finally, for b :
It is easy to see that, for a, b ∈ Z k q and for a ∈ Z N q ,
The message space is M = Z q for a given modulus q with # bits(q) = κ = κ(λ, L). Let n = n(λ) be the lattice dimension and let χ = χ(λ) be the error distribution over Z q (chosen appropriately for LWE: it must achieve at least 2 λ security against known attacks). Choose m = m(λ) = O(nlogq). So the parameters used in all algorithms are n, q, χ, m. We have that l = log q + 1 is the number of bits of q, and we let N = (n + 1) · l.
Keygen(λ):
-sample t :
q . -set A to be the (n + 1)-column matrix consisting of b followed by the n columns of B
Encrypt(pk, µ ∈ M):
Decrypt(sk, C): -observe that the first l coefficients of v are 1, 2, . . . , 2
The Decrypt algorithm can recover the message µ when it is in a 'small space' (q = 2, i.e. M = Z 2 ). For an algorithm that can recover any µ ∈ Z q , we refer to the MPDec algorithm as described (as a special case) in [GSW13] and in [MP11] . If the ciphertext is generated correctly, it is not difficult to show that
q . Now, the Decrypt algorithm uses only the i-th coefficient of the vector C · v ∈ Z N q , i.e. < C i , v >= µ · v i + < R i , e >∈ Z q . Moreover, in the Decrypt step, i has to be such that v i := 2 i ∈ (q/4, q/2], with i ∈ [1, 2, . . . , 2 l−1 ]. Now remember that l = log q + 1 equals the number of bits of q. Hence we have
Therefore the only possible value for 2 i ∈ (q/4, q/2] is 2 l−2 . For this reason, Decrypt can be simply rewritten as Decrypt(sk, C):
One could think of outputting as ciphertext only the (l − 2)-th row C l−2 of the matrix C; this is actually not possible since the full matrix is still needed in order to perform the homomorphic operations (in particular, the multiplication of two ciphertexts). We will not discuss them here; see [GSW13] .
Our Key Recovery Attack
We are going to recover bit by bit each coefficient t i of the secret vector t := (t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ Z n q . For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let BitDecomp(t i ) := (t i,0 , t i,1 , . . . , t i,l−1 ) ∈ Z l q bits ordered from least to most significant. We explicitly remark that t i = l−1 j=0 2 j t i,j . We will proceed as follows: start with i = 1 and recover, in this order, the bits from most to least significant. Then continue with i = 2, and so on until i = n. Let x ∈ Z q . Since #bits(q) = l, we have x ≤ q − 1 ≤ 2 l − 2. Moreover, we have #bits(x) ≤ log 2 (q − 1) + 1 := l * . We have l * = l if q is not a power of 2, i.e. if q = 2 h , for any h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l − 1}. Otherwise, l * = l − 1. We will not distinguish between these two cases: just remark that if l * = l − 1, then t i,l−1 = 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Recovering BitDecomp(t 1 ) We start by recovering BitDecomp(t 1 ). The trickiest part is to recover the most significant bit. We start by recovering t 1,l−1 , t 1,l−2 , t 1,l−3 . We have to choose, and submit to the decryption oracle, a matrix C ∈ Z N ×N q . Then the oracle will compute x =< C l−2 , v > and will output the rounded value µ = x/2 l−2 . Our attack works also, with a trivial modification, in the case we define the rounding function such that n + 1/2 := n, for every n ∈ N. Our strategy is to submit a matrix C whose entries are all 0 except for the (l − 2)-th row C l−2 . Let y = (y 1 , . . . , y N ) ∈ Z N q be the vector representing C l−2 . We select y = (0, . . . , 0, −1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Z N q where −1 is in l + 1-th position, i.e.
Through the decryption oracle, we have x =< y, v >= −v l+1 = t 1 ∈ Z q and µ = t 1 /2 l−2 . There are two cases.
1. µ = 0. In this case, we have 0 ≤ i.e. t 1 < 2 l−3 = l−4 j=0 2 j + 1. Then it must be t 1,l−1 = t 1,l−2 = t 1,l−3 = 0 .
2. 1 ≤ µ ≤ 4. In particular, 2 l−3 ≤ t 1 ≤ 2 l − 2. Then we have
Next, query the decryption oracle with y = (0, . . . , 0, −1, 0, 0, −1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Z N q with −1 in (l − 2)-th and (l + 1)-th positions:
Through the decryption oracle, we have x =< y, v >= t 1 − 2 l−3 ≥ 0 and µ = Then it must be t 1,l−1 = t 1,l−2 = 0 . Condition (5) implies that t 1,l−3 = 1 .
2.2. 1 ≤ µ ≤ 3. In particular, 2 l−2 ≤ t 1 ≤ 2 l − 2. Then we have
Next, query the decryption oracle with y = (0, . . . , 0, −1, 0, −1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Z N q , with −1 in (l − 1)-th and (l + 1)-th positions:
Through the decryption oracle, we have x =< y, v >= t 1 − 2 l−2 ≥ 0 and µ = This means that t 1,l−1 = 0 . Therefore, condition (6) implies that t 1,l−2 = 1 .
Moreover, since we have 0 ≤ t 1 − 2 l−2 < 2 l−3 , we have that t 1,l−3 = 0 .
2.2.2. 1 ≤ µ ≤ 2. In particular, 2 l−3 + 2 l−2 ≤ t 1 . Next, query the decryption oracle with y = (0, . . . , 0, −1, −1, 0, −1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Z N q , with −1 in (l − 2)-th, (l − 1)-th and (l + 1)-th positions:
Through the decryption oracle, we have x =< y, v >= t 1 − (2 l−3 + 2 l−2 ) ≥ 0
. There are two cases: 2.2.2.1. µ = 0. In this case, we have 0 ≤ Moreover, we have 2 l−3 ≤ t 1 − 2 l−2 < 2 l−2 ; hence t 1,l−3 = 1 .
2.2.2.2. µ = 1. We have 2 l−1 ≤ t 1 ≤ 2 l − 2. This implies t 1,l−1 = 1 . We now have to recover t 1,l−2 , t 1,l−3 . Next, query the decryption oracle with y = (0, . . . , 0, −1, −1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Z N q , with −1 in l-th and (l + 1)-th positions:
Through the decryption oracle, we have x =< y, v >= t 1 − 2 l−1 ≥ 0 and
. There are two cases: 22 2.2.2.2.1. µ = 0. In this case, we have 0
j=0 2 j + 1. This implies t 1,l−2 = t 1,l−3 = 0 .
2.2.2.2.2. 1 ≤ µ ≤ 3. In particular, 2 l−3 ≤ t 1 − 2 l−1 . Then we have
Next, query the decryption oracle with y = (0, . . . , 0, −1, 0, −1, −1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Z N q , with −1 in (l − 2)-th, l-th and (l + 1)-th positions:
Through the decryption oracle, we have
. There are two cases:
2.2.2.2.2.1. µ = 0. In this case, we have 0
. This means that t 1,l−2 = 0 . Condition (7) then implies
Then, we have t 1,l−2 = 1 . We still have to find t 1,l−3 . Next, query the decryption oracle with y = (0, . . . , 0, −1, −1, −1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Z N q , where −1 is in (l − 1)-th, l-th and (l + 1)-th positions:
. There are two cases: 2.2.2.2.2.2.1. µ = 0. In this case,
This implies that t 1,l−3 = 0 .
2.2.2.2.2.2.2. µ = 1. Then 2 l−3 ≤ t 1 − 2 l−1 − 2 l−2 . This implies that t 1,l−3 = 1 .
At this point, we know the first three significant bits t 1,l−1 , t 1,l−2 , t 1,l−3 of t 1 . Notice that we have recovered the first three most significant bits with at most 7 oracle queries. Next, we are going to recover t 1,l−4 . Query the decryption oracle with y = (0, . . . , 0, −t 1,l−3 , −t 1,l−2 , −t 1,l−1 , −1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Z N q where −t 1,i is in (i + 1)-th position. Then x =< y, v >= t 1 − (t 1,l−1 2 l−1 + t 1,l−2 2 l−2 + t 1,l−3 2 l−3 )
Now, we have 0 ≤ x < 2 l−3 . Therefore, µ = x/2 l−2 = 0, and so not useful at all to learn t 1,l−4 . The idea is to 'shift' the bits 'to the left', i.e. towards the most significant. So, let us instead choose y = 2 · (0, . . . , 0, −t 1,l−3 , −t 1,l−2 , −t 1,l−1 , −1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Z N q So now x =< y, v > is such that 0 ≤ x < 2 l−2 . After submitting y to the decryption oracle, it will compute and output µ = x/2 l−2 . Then t 1,l−4 = µ . Now we can generalize and recover t 1,k , for all k = l − 4, l − 5, . . . , 1, 0. This will complete the recovery of t 1 . Suppose that, for a given k, we recovered already t 1,m , ∀m ∈ [k +1, . . . , l− 1]. We then recover t 1,k by recurrence. Choose 
We recover completely t 1 after at most 7 + (l − 3) = l + 4 oracle queries.
Recovering BitDecomp(t r ), for every r ∈ [1, 2, . . . , n] We can now generalize and recover BitDecomp(t r ), for every r ∈ [1, 2, . . . , n], in a way analogous to what has been done for the case r = 1. The only difference is that, when choosing y ∈ Z N q , we set −1 in position rl + 1. So, for a given r ∈ [1, 2, . . . , n], we have the following.
-Recovering the first three most significant bits t r,l−1 , t r,l−2 , t r,l−3 . This is done exactly as in the case of t 1 , with the only modification y l+1 = 0 and y rl+1 = −1 always. -Recovering t r,k , for all k = l − 4, l − 5, . . . , 1, 0. Suppose that, for a given k, we recovered already t r,m , ∀m ∈ [k + 1, . . . , l − 1]. We then recover t r,k by recurrence. Choose In summary, we can recover the secret key t ∈ Z n q with at most (l + 4) · n oracle queries.
Algorithmic Description
Formally, the attack from Section 7.2 can be described by Algorithm 6. For a given vector y = (y 1 , . . . , y N ) ∈ Z N q , we let C y ∈ M N ×N (Z q ) be the square N × N matrix whose entries are all 0 except for the (l − 2)-th row C l−2 , which is y. We have denoted the decryption oracle O D (C y ) := Decrypt(sk, C y ) = <y,v> 2 l−2
. For ease of notation, we have also considered the standard vectors e 1 , . . . , e N ∈ Z N q : for every i = 1, . . . , N , e i is the 0-vector except in position i, where it has value 1: (e i,1 , . . . , e i,N ) = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) , e i,i = 1, e i,j = 0 for j = i
We put d i := −e i , for all i.
Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that the SHE schemes from [BV11b, BV11a, BGV12, Bra12, GSW13] suffer from key recovery attacks when the attacker is given access to the decryption oracle. Combining the results from [LMSV12, ZPS12] , we now know that most existing SHE schemes suffer from key recovery attacks, and so they are not IND-CCA1 secure. As such, a natural next step is to investigate whether it is possible to enhance these SHE schemes to avoid key recovery attacks and make them IND-CCA1 secure. One thing we should keep in mind is to preserve their homomorphic properties. Following the work of [LMSV12] , one could think of tweaking the decryption step of a SHE scheme by including a ciphertext validity check in order to make sure that, with some high probability, the ciphertext is honestly generated by the attacker and not specifically chosen for the purpose of recovering a given bit (or bits) of the secret key. Unfortunately, we cannot directly apply the techniques from [LMSV12] due to the fact that the SHE scheme from [LMSV12] enjoys some particular algebraic properties which do not exist in other schemes. So, we need to treat each SHE scheme individually.
